In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological (...) experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies. (shrink)

Jeanine Grenberg - Imagination in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 335-336 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Jeanine M. Grenberg St. Olaf College Bernard Freydberg. Imagination in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005. Pp. xiii + 180. Paper, $19.95. At the heart of the task of the historian of philosophy is the effort to interpret well (...) what has been said by another philosopher. Like the poet who chooses to create verse under the constraints of meter and rhyme, the historian does philosophy under the constraints of the historical text. Given these constraints, any historian of philosophy—continental or analytic—must bind herself to the text. The significant distinction one.. (shrink)

In previous years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, (...) but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology. (shrink)

Henry Allison's “Incorporation Thesis” has played an important role in recent discussions of Kantian ethics. By focussing on Kant's claim that “a drive [Triebfeder] can determine the will to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim,” Allison has successfully argued against Kant's critics that desire-based non-moral action can be free action. His work has thus opened the door for a wide range of discussions which integrate feeling into moral action more deeply than had (...) previously been considered “Kantian”. (shrink)

In this book, Professor Jeanine Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a system of eudaemonism, indeed, as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms of it: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism. In Deontological Eudaemonism, one achieves happiness both rationally conceived and empirically conceived only via authentic commitment to and fulfilment of what is demanded of all rational beings: making persons as such one's end in (...) all things. To tell this story of Deontological Eudaemonism, Grenberg first defends the notion that Kant's deontological approach to ethics is simultaneously teleological. She then shows that the realization of an aptitude for the virtuous fulfilment of one's obligatory ends provides the solid basis for simultaneous realization of happiness, both rationally and empirically conceived. Along the way, she argues both that Kant's notion of happiness rationally conceived is essentially identical to Aristotle's conception of happiness as unimpeded activity, and that his notion of happiness empirically conceived is best realized via an unwavering commitment to the fulfilment of one's obligatory ends. (shrink)

Introduction Recent accounts of humility, such as Norvin Richards', emphatically set aside any “Catholic metaphysics” that might ground the state, finding its view of human nature – one which asks us to consider ourselves as “contemptible” and “foul” – to be deeply problematic. Richards turns instead to an empirical and behavioral analysis of humility, focusing upon an individual agent's awareness of the flaws, failings and limits specific to her to ground humility. For example, when he asks what it would mean (...) to be “humble” about having a scholarly article accepted for publication in a prestigious journal, he says the following: Suppose, for example, that you have just had an article accepted by a leading journal. You have never been successful there before. In fact, this is much better than you ever did earlier in your career, and as you think of your progress, you are pleased. There are other ways to look at things, though. How does your work compare to what your colleagues are doing? To the work of contemporaries at similar institutions? To that of the leading philosophers of the day? To the Nichomachean Ethics, or the Theory of Descriptions? (shrink)

Article Commentary Jeanine Grenberg, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.

Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have recently offered interpretations of Kant's argument in Groundwork III. These interpretations share this premise: the argument moves from a non-moral, theoretical premise to a moral conclusion, and the failure of the argument is a failure to make this jump from the non-moral to the moral. This characterization both of the nature of the argument and its failure is flawed. Consider instead the possibility that in Groundwork III, Kant is struggling toward something rather different from (...) this, not trying to pull the moral rabbit out of the theoretical hat, but instead seeking a proto-phenomenological grounding of morality: a grounding that begins from first personal felt experiences that already possess moral content, and proceeds to its further practical claims via attentive reflection on these felt experiences. This paper brings this assumption to our reading of Groundwork III, showing that in doing so we acquire a deeper appreciation both of the argument, and the reasons it fails. Kant's argument is practical throughout. And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant's nascent efforts to provide a new, phenomenological method for the grounding of practical philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, I look at some claims Anne Margaret Baxley makes, in her recent book Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, about the relationship between reason and sensibility in Kant's theory of virtue. I then reflect on tensions I find in these claims as compared to the overall goal of her book: an account of Kant's conception of virtue as autocracy. Ultimately, I argue that interpreters like Baxley who want to welcome a more robust role for feeling (...) in Kantian ethics must, in order to achieve our purposes, move beyond the general account of the limits for the role of the moral feeling of respect in the grounding of Kant's ethics which Henry Allison established in his influential Kant's Theory of Freedom. (shrink)

Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the so-called Formula of Humanity, appeals to the humanity in our persons as an unconditional end-in-itself that may never be used merely as a means. Various interpretive challenges have led to scholarly disagreement concerning what Kant meant by the term ‘humanity’ in this formulation. Four views emerge from the literature: (1) humanity is an abstract idea, (2) humanity is the capacity for end-setting generally, (3) humanity is the capacity for morality, and (4) humanity (...) is a good will. After surveying each of these views, this chapter argues for a teleological reading of ‘humanity’ in one’s person. A focus on Kant’s first Critique discussion of ideas and ideals reveals that the ‘idea of humanity’ and ‘ideal of humanity’ both determine which capacities define an actually existing human being and provide the regulative ideal or telos articulating the vocation of that human being’s existence. This ‘idea’ and ‘ideal’ of humanity reveal that the capacity for morality, broadly conceived as autonomous self-legislation of categorical moral demands extending both to the choice of maxims and the setting of obligatory ends, a capacity which undergirds and makes possible one’s non-moral capacities for end-setting and prudential choice, is definitional of humanity. This capacity simultaneously identifies human beings as the kind of being they are, and allows those beings to become worthy of that humanity through moral development. (shrink)

I argue that there can be, on Kant's account, a significant motivational role for feeling in moral action. I first discuss and reject Andrews Reath's claim that Kant is forced to disallow a motivational role for feeling because of his rejection of moral sense theory. I then consider and reject the more general challenge that allowing a role for the influence of feeling on the faculty of desire undermines Kant's commitment to a morality free from anthropological considerations. I conclude by (...) providing an overview of Kant's discussion of the moral feeling of respect which shows this feeling to meet the criteria he sets for inclusion in moral motivation. (shrink)

In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s (...) texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo, who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude, remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence. (shrink)

In this paper, I reject Frierson’s interpretation of Kantian reductionist phenomenology. I diagnose his failure to articulate a more robust notion of phenomenology in Kant as traceable to a misguided effort to protect pure reason from the undue influence of sensibility. But in fact Kant himself relies regularly on a phenomenological and felt first personal perspective in his practical philosophy. Once we think more broadly about what Frierson calls “the space of reasons,” we must admit a robust role for attentive (...) reflection upon felt, phenomenological experience at the center of Kantian practical deliberation. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to questions Sticker and Saunders raise about integrating third-personal interactions within my phenomenological first-personal account of moral obligatedness. Sticker argues that third-personal interactions are more central for grounding moral obligatedness than I admit. Saunders turns things around and suggests we might not even be able to access third-personal interactions with others at the level one would need to in order to secure proper moral interactions with them. I argue in response that both these challenges misunderstand (...) something about my phenomenological first-personal account of the grounding of moral obligation. Sticker assumes that I make absolutely no room for third-personal interactions as important for morality, but that is not the case. And Saunders assumes that first-, second- and third-personal interactions demand phenomenological access to oneself and others as transcendentally free, but I deny that claim. I will consider each of these challenges in turn. (shrink)

Kant’s commitment to autonomy raises difficult questions about the very possibility of Kantian moral education, since appeal to external pedagogical guidance threatens to be in contradiction with autonomous virtue. Furthermore, moral education seems to involve getting good at something through repetition; but Kant seems to eschew the notion of repeated natural activity as antithetical to autonomy. Things become even trickier once we remember that Kant also views autonomous human beings as radically evil: we are capable of choosing rationally and autonomously, (...) but, left to our own devices, that same capacity for reason might tempt us to choose only out of a concern to satisfy our happiness. We thus need a moral education which realizes autonomy while dodging the dual bullets of external natural forces and internal evil forces. Ultimately, his concerns about external natural forces and internal evil forces do not lead Kant to reject either moral education or a role for repeated activity in it. Rathe... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy ed. by Jane Kneller and Sidney AxinnJeanine GrenbergJane Kneller and Sidney Axinn, editors, Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 334. Paper, $21.95.The intent of this volume is not narrow textual exegesis but the application of Kantian themes to “problems of contemporary society,” (xi). The editors (...) thus advise their readers that “[t]he present collection is … ‘Kantian’ in a broad sense,” and that the opinions put forward by the contributors may “diverge rather widely” (viii) from Kant’s own. In an introductory essay, Jane Kneller notes further that the book distinguishes between “political” philosophy in a narrow sense, and “social” philosophy, which is concerned with “the behaviour of human beings” more broadly construed. Kant, Kneller argues, does have such a “social philosophy,” and this volume will reveal it.The book is largely successful in its stated goal. The essays run the gamut of careful, if controversial, textual analyses (e.g., Allen Wood’s and Robert Paul Wolff’s essays) to those which take Kant simply as a launching pad for an analysis of a variety of social issues. At times, this relation to Kant is a positive one (e.g., Harry van der Linden’s claim that Kant provides the basis for enterprise democracy), and at times negative (e.g., Charles Mills’ claim that Kantian respect for persons masks a “dark ontology” which supports structural racism).A careful reader can find among these varied essays interestingly opposed approaches to similar topics. Wolff and Sharon Anderson-Gold [End Page 538] end up at loggerheads over the relation of Kant’s ethical and social philosophies. Wolff makes Kant’s justification of morality derivative of the establishment of the social contract. But Anderson-Gold argues for a reversed relationship; for her, Kant’s “principle of humanity” grounds a basic human right of persons in any society to be free from certain types of state interference.Another interesting juxtaposition is found between Nelson Potter and Thomas Auxter, both of whom tackle Kant’s views on retributivism. Potter seeks to humanize retributivism by showing its basis in equality and respect for persons. Auxter takes a diametrically opposed approach, arguing that Kant’s moral theory can stand unscathed if we eliminate his now outdated retributivist commitments.A meta-issue looms in all these discussions: what does and doesn’t count as “Kantian”? This book, wisely, provides no hard and fast definition; rather, by presenting a broad variety of at times seriously divergent points of view, it constitutes a refreshingly pluralistic response to what counts as Kantian: Kantian is as Kantian does. It is rare to find such diversity of interpretation in a single volume, and this book is to be commended for achieving it.There are, however, prices to pay for the achievement of diversity, the largest being a certain disconnectedness of thought. The sectioning of the book into two parts—“Kantian Social Theory” and “Kant and Contemporary Social Issues” —instead of helping to guide the reader, ends up encouraging an ultimately strained distinction. Why does Robin Schott’s essay on feminism belong with “social theory” instead of “contemporary social issues”? Why don’t Anderson-Gold’s reflections on the relationship between moral and social issues qualify as “social theory”? It might have been better, organizationally, to highlight more specific themes by distinguishing sections on “Retributivism,” “International Law,” and the like.The individual essays vary in their success in defending their stated theses. Allen Wood is insightful and even-handed in convincing this initially skeptical reader of what seems, at first blush, a rather implausible view of Kant as an historical materialist. Though some may not find his own position to be very “liberal,” Gerald Gaus’ assessment of the current state of Kantian liberalist approaches to environmental values and his proposed alternative are cogent, enlightening and challenging. Sidney Axinn’s acceptance, without argument, of a simple analogy between individual persons and individual nation states to argue for the need for a world government makes his account ultimately dissatisfying. Charles Mills rightly takes note of an editor’s concern that... (shrink)

466 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 offered in Rameau's Nephew called into question his long-held conviction that "even in a society as poorly ordered as ours.., there is no better path to happiness than to be a good man," Hulliung tends to assume too quickly that the Nephew's attacks on this belief carry the day . Diderot did, after all, eventually provide the Nephew's antago- nist with some responses and, while these may not always convince us, (...) it is somewhat rash to assume that Diderot himself viewed them as completely empty. Further, while Hulliung carefully shows us what Rousseau found lacking in the philosophes' Enlighten- ment, it is not entirely clear whether the arguments he offered inJulie, Emile, and the Social Contract really constitute a "positive program for an alternative enlightenment" . Readers may leave the book still questioning whether Rousseau shared anything with his former colleagues other than their most troubling doubts. The tension between the promise announced in the book's title and the more precise focus delineated in the subtitle captures what is at stake rather nicely: in what sense does the quarrel between "Rousseau and the Philosophes" constitute an "Auto- critique of Enlightenment"? Hulliung rightly notes that "it was one of Rousseau's gifts that he always succeeded in bringing out the worst in the philosophes" . The book amply demonstrates that the same could be said of their ability to.. (shrink)

Making sense of how intelligible notions in Kant's moral philosophy make a place for themselves in the sensible, natural world is perhaps one of the greatest challenges to a Kantian moral philosopher. In this book, Rauscher takes on that question with great aplomb, by looking carefully at an impressive array of Kant's texts, and assessing the extent to which one can say Kant is a realist, or naturalist. Rauscher's intelligent and creative conclusion, in his words, is as follows: I have (...) identified a Kantian transcendental moral idealism that is also an empirical realism, thus dissolving some of the realist/constructivist disagreement. I show, however, that Kant is himself hesitant to endorse this transcendental... (shrink)

In this paper, I address the theme of harmony by investigating that harmony of person necessary for obtaining wisdom. Central to achievement of that harmony is the removal of the unstable, unharmonious presence of self-deception within one’s moral character.

We are told in the introduction to this volume that what holds together such an apparently diverse collection of essays under a single rubric is the theme of "human nature." And this is fair enough: themes ranging from Kant's reflections on physiology, to his investigation of the vexed notion of what it is that constitutes a race, to his reflections on philosophy of history, to his lectures on pedagogy all fit reasonably enough under the rubric of "human nature." All point (...) us, that is, toward a clearer understanding of how Kant would have answered the question, "What is a human being?" Yet this straight-laced, somewhat mundane description of this volume's contents belies the quirky, unexpected, and downright strange reflections that can be found therein. Perhaps those familiar with Kant's famous dinner parties would have expected him to say that "[b]odily motions prescribed by a doctor who is not a philosopher weaken the invalid's body, unless they are seasoned with some social amusement and affect the body favorably". But who would have expected Kant to recommend that "[i]n. (shrink)

In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative (...) interpretation, according to which the fact of reason refers to the actuality of our moral consciousness. (shrink)

This introduction briefly lays out the basics of Kant’s concept, transcendental freedom, and some of its discontents. It also provides an overview of the dossier itself, introducing Katerina Deligiorgi’s discussion of ought-implies-can, Patrick Frierson’s account of degrees of responsibility, and Jeanine Grenberg’s treatment of the third-person.

This paper explores the relationship between empirical psychology, transcendental critique, and phenomenology in Kant’s discussion of respect for the moral law, particularly as that is found in the Critique of Practical Reason. I first offer an empirical-psychological reading of moral respect, in the context of which I distinguish transcendental and empirical perspectives on moral action and defend H. J. Paton’s claim that moral motivation can be seen from two points of view, where “from one point of view, [respect] is the (...) cause of our action, but from another point of view the moral law is its ground.” Then, after a discussion of a distinction between first- and second-order transcendental/practical perspectives where reasons for action are first-order practical judgments while the conditions of possibility for those reasons’ authority are expressed in second-order judgments, I turn to a third kind of perspective: the properly phenomenological one. I explain the general notion of Kantian phenomenology with an example of the experience of time from Kant’s Anthropology before applying this to a phenomenological reading of the discussion of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason. I end by noting that on my account, in contrast to that of Jeanine Grenberg, the distinctive phenomenology of respect is not systematically important for grounding claims in moral philosophy. (shrink)

This paper focuses on responding to Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that my discussion of Kant’s feeling of respect leaves no meaningful room for investigating feeling first-personally. I first make clear that I do think that feelings can be investigated first-personally, both in that they can be prospective reasons for action and in that – at least in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment – there are feelings that we should have. I then show that at the time of (...) writing the “Incentives” chapter of the second Critique, Kant had not yet determined an a priori basis for aesthetic normativity. On this basis, I argue that the “Incentives” chapter provides a sort of consolation prize for not having an transcendental account of feeling. In that sense, it’s a properly transcendental analysis of feeling in which Kant examines feeling from within and a priori to show that there are good reasons to have certain feelings. I end by acknowledging the extent to which, on this reading, I agree with Grenberg that Kant is doing a transcendentally significant form of phenomenology here, while I also highlight some remaining areas of disagreement. (shrink)

Sharon Anderson-Gold - Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 666-667 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Sharon Anderson-Gold Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Jeanine Grenberg. Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 269. Cloth, $75.00 In Kant and the Ethics of Humility, (...) Jeanine Grenberg proposes to rehabilitate the virtue of humility. As she states in her introduction: "Humility is a curious virtue with a checkered history." Humility, Grenberg.. (shrink)